Through presented paper, we provide a simple negotiation model in a multi-agent system, where every agent has incomplete set of information about all other agents. Agents in our algorithm collaborate with other agents for optimizing the final solution while preserving their individual privacies. Agents implement the idea of collaboration by sharing their profits with other agents. Therefore an agent prefers existing proposals from other agents to generate its proposals instead of considering proposals solely based on its personal profit. We eliminate the need of a centralizing agent and maintain that minimal information flow is needed among agents while reaching toward an optimal solution. Possible use of our algorithm can be seen in areas where multiple agents are trying to optimize their individual functions through a common solution such as placement of network routers, vehicle routing and job distribution.
INTRODUCTION
With increasing usability of distributed systems and autonomous agents, finding optimal solutions that meet all the distributed set of constraints is becoming of significant interest. One way to design solutions for these problems is through a combination of local computations and sufficient communication among the agents. However, there can be problems where local objectives and data must be kept private and only limited communication among agents is permitted. Moreover, individual interests of agents can be partially common and partially different. For problems of such nature, different models of negotiation have been studied as part of game theory or distributed artificial intelligence. In our research, we are addressing the problem of finding a common meeting point in multiple agents through negotiations. One popular algorithm for solving distributed problems through negotiation is Contract Net Protocol [9] . Within a network, agents implementing the CNP optimize the distribution of tasks through bidding process. An agent shares its tasks with other agents by announcing the bids and giving the task contract to highest bidder. T. Sandholm [10] extended the bidding approach by including the concept of marginal cost calculation. Our algorithm includes some core principals of [9] and [10] i.e conducting the negotiation process without a central agent and assuming the roles of contractor or manager depends on situation. However, we further extend it by introducing the collaboration concept among agents. That is, Agents on receiving side consider the scope of improvement in incoming bid along with accepting or rejecting it after its evaluation. While generating a new bid proposal, agent picks those proposals to improve which are already favorable to other agents. Resulting proposals are expected to be more acceptable to other agents in the network than a new proposal generated without this incremental revision process. We have embedded the idea of profit sharing along with bid proposal announcements. When an agent announces a proposal, it also proposes to share its profit (that it will earn if proposal is accepted and executed) with rest of the agents. Therefore, other agents evaluate a proposal based on overall profit they will earn considering their individual cost and received share of profits of other agents implicitly included in the proposals. In principal, this concept is similar to marginal cost calculation in [10] but implementation is different because of changed nature of problem and bid announcement and revision strategies we have used in our protocol. Some researchers [2, 12] have proposed distributed negotiation algorithms with partly private data that implement learning about other agents. Provided with incomplete amount of information about other agents, a negotiating agent forms its beliefs about them by observing the patterns of their negotiations and generates the bids based on them to maximize its personal profit. In our protocol, the process of modifying a bid from other agents automatically improves the solution based on the agents' personal preferences and compensate for the absence of deliberate learning while keeping it simple. Optimal solution for problem is achieved by iterative negotiation from every agent with all other agents, till convergence. Our algorithm searches for optimal solution without any external constraints. However, it works in a hill-climbing fashion such that successive solutions in every iteration are better than existing solutions, until such improvement is not obtainable by modifying any of the existing bids. In our implementation, algorithm exits when quality of solution/bids stops improving. This way, we also avoid the situation of algorithm getting stuck in local maximum.
II.
OUR APPROACH In this section, we discuss the problem that we designed for implementing our algorithm, our negotiation framework and agents' strategy to generate and evaluate the proposals.
A. Problem Statement
Our algorithm is designed to solve a problem that consists of n agents that are situated at different locations in a two dimensional plane and need to meet at a common point. Each agent has a different cost to reach the destination. Cost of an agent depends on two factors i.e. total time spent to reach the destination and its total fuel consumption. All agents have different values (mpg, mph) and relative weights (w1, w2) assigned to these attributes that contribute for the agents' cost calculations. Agents have no information about other agents' costs. Through our algorithm we are trying to minimize the overall and individual costs spent by all agents by finding a new meeting point using distributed negotiation. In order to start the negotiation process we provide a tentative initial solution (in this case, a meeting point). All agents start their negotiations over this initially decided point and keep looking for better meeting points through consecutive iterations. In our implementation, we decided this initial point to be the one that is at equal distance from all the agents. Since our test experiment consists of three agents, the circumcenter of their coordinate locations will have equal distance from all the agents. All agents want to reduce their individual travelling costs and they do so by moving the meeting point closer to themselves. Therefore, every agent sends proposals to all other agents for changing the meeting point. From the resultant savings, the initiator agent offers to share some reward with other agents to induce them to change the current destination to the new proposed point. Since an agent is not aware about any other agent's cost, it proposes equal share of its benefits in its proposals as reward to every other agent. The benefit is the cost that the agent saves through changing the meeting point from current points to a new point that it proposes.
B. Negotiation Framework
An agent in our protocol plays one of the following two roles. Initiator: Agent who creates a proposal and sends to others Responder: Every other agent in the process but initiator During the negotiation process, every agent acts as an initiator on its turn for generating proposal. The same agent acts as a responder when proposals are generated and sent by other agents. Initiator agent uses its personal database to generate new proposal and to save proposals. As shown in Figure 2 .1, agent's personal database consists of two priority queues and one single element data structure. • Accepted Proposals: Agent uses this queue to store all those proposals that are accepted by every responder agent. Proposals are kept in a sorted order in the queue based on the total profit a proposal can cause for all agents i.e. sum of every agent's profit. Total profit remains same for all agents for any proposal and every agent has accepted each proposal in this queue. Therefore, every agent actually stores same proposals in same order as any other agent's 'Accepted Proposals' queue in its 'Accepted Proposals' queue. • Modifiable Proposals: This queue is maintained by every responder to store those proposals that it doesn't accept but considers to modify them for generating new proposals in future. A proposal rejected by any other agent has to be rejected overall and cannot make in this queue. In other words, to be stored in 'Modifiable Proposals' queue of the agent, a proposal needs to be accepted or at-least considered modifiable by other agents. The queue is maintained in a sorted order based on total personal profit the agent is supposed to earn from given proposal. Agent refers to this queue for modifying the most profitable proposal available here and sends this as its own proposal on its turn of negotiation. • Last Proposal Generated: This data structure can contain only one proposal and is used to hold the last proposal generated by agent. Purpose of this storage is to help the agent in generating a new proposal from its own previous proposals, in case if 'Modifiable Proposals' queue is empty.
As shown in Figure 2 .1, there are two ways an agent can generate a new proposal.
• Taking the best of the existing proposals by other agents that the agent considers as modifiable ones. Agent tries to pull the meeting point given in that proposal, closer to its original location. • In case if there are no modifiable proposals from other agents, agent considers its own last proposal and generates a better proposal out of it through the same procedure as mentioned in previous step. 3. An agent accepts a proposal if the proposal generates the profit at least as high as s1 for the agent. If the profit ranges between s1 and s2, agent considers the proposal for modification in future. Any proposal, which generates lesser profit than s2 is rejected by the agent. PROFIT CALCULATION AND CONVERGENCE OF ALGORITHM In this section, we discuss strategies to calculate profit by a initiator to generate proposals and by a responders to evaluate upcoming proposals.
A. Profit Calculation for Initiator
As shown in fig 3. 1, Initiator calculates its profit before generating a proposal using the difference between current and new cost of travelling. Since initiator shares its profit equally among all agents, its profit is one-nth of generated profit. . pr x =i+cost r-m -cost r-x + pr m --(3.2.1 
D. Algorithm Convergence
In this section, we discuss that how our protocol guarantees for negotiation process not getting stuck in an endless loop and exiting eventually after finding the best solution it can reach. Our algorithm stays in process as long as it keeps finding improvement in quality of solutions. In order to generate successful negotiations, there have to be some agents that can provide profitable rewards to other agents while saving themselves some travel cost. Since, criterion (3.1.1) permits an agent to generate a proposal only by shifting the meeting point toward its origin location, i.e. According to condition (3.1.1) , for any agent destination point cannot shift farther than its original location from meeting point. In addition, criteria (3.1.2) and (3.1.3 ) ensure that profit graph through any new proposal should only move upward for an agent that created the proposal. If an agent proposes any other meeting point after proposing its original location, it will violate criteria (3.1.2) and (3.1.3) . Therefore, if an agent keeps generating overall rewarding proposals, its last proposal will be the one with meeting point coinciding with its original location. Above statement implies that in no case any agent is capable of endlessly proposing improvised solutions. Negotiations from any agent will come to an end once destination point coincides with its original location. The other case when destination point wouldn't shift to an agent's original location would occur only when that agent could not offer enough profit for all agents involved in its negotiations. In that case, process will terminate eventually after observing no improvement in quality of solutions for a while. Hence, either the agents will stop generating proposals after sharing their maximum profit; or, a series of unaccepted or less beneficial proposals will prompt the algorithm to exit. Therefore, algorithm will converge in any case where agents are situated at finite distance from each other and finite steps are needed to reach from meeting point to each agent's location. In either of the cases, algorithm will keep running as long as it sees a scope of better proposals. Therefore, algorithm will reach to an optimal or close to an optimal solution. However, similar to any hill-climbing algorithm, a global optimum cannot be guaranteed through our protocol. Nevertheless, experimental results suggested that by increasing the waiting time algorithm was more capable of passing the local maxima.
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IV. RESULTS
We expected our algorithm to decrease the final costs for all agents. Therefore, meeting point was expected to shift closer to agents with higher travelling costs as those agents were capable of provide better incentive and save more cost. Our solutions complied with our assumptions. While final meeting points were closer to the agents with higher costs, agents with lesser costs travelled more in exchange of rewards. As a result in general, final cost to meet at that destination point was lesser than original cost for every agent after including rewards. Nevertheless, negotiation results got affected by number of other aspects as well such as, Coordinate positions of agents relative to each other, differences among their costs. For different values of costs and distances among agents, we applied multiple negotiation strategies by changing the parameters S1 and S2 shown in figure 2.3. It was observed that no strategy was a clear winner in all cases. For instances in both cases i.e for varying costs and distances, when agents had higher benchmarks for negotiation, generated profits in best cases were better with higher time consumption. For lower negotiation benchmarks, time consumption for solutions improved significantly with some compromise in solutions quality. However, overall relations with distance and cost were similar in all strategies for given datasets.
Following observations were made for changing parameters of negotiation with different data sets as shown in Fig 4.1.1,  Fig 4.1.2, Fig 4.2.1 and Fig 4. 
A. Effect of Distance over Negotiation
As shown in Dataset-I, we changed agents A's location in a way that it kept going farther from both B and C with equal distance, making two objects closer than third one. Fig 4. 1.1 and 4.1.2 display the results when agents had high and low negotiation benchmark respectively. While individual time consumption and cost effectiveness of solutions were slightly different in both strategies, overall time consumption was directly proportional to distances among agents. Moreover, differences in distances travelled and total savings kept increasing with as C moved further from A and B. Table A concludes the overall savings of all agents together for varying original locations of A with different negotiation benchmarks. All rows are sorted from highest to lowest negotiation benchmarks. While first row has most stringent acceptance criterion; last row has most liberal acceptance and modification criteria. Fig 4.1.1 and Fig 4.1.2 display results for two different negotiation benchmarks. Difference in acceptance criteria affected mainly the time consumption and slightly the cost effectiveness of results. With lower negotiation benchmark, time consumption was lesser as instead of renegotiating over some proposals, agents accepted those and moved to other points for generating new proposal.
With higher negotiation benchmark as long as those proposals stayed in modifiable range new proposals could not be generated. For the same reason, wider range of modifiable solutions resulted in better 'average' and/or 'least' savings as shown by Table A . Overall results were closely cost effective through all acceptance criteria. Only exception was when agents had highest and most stringent benchmark for proposal acceptance. In that case, for most of the x values algorithm exited prematurely after a series of failed negotiations and delivered a very low average saving. Fig 4.1.1 s1: Profit> = 0 (Fig 4.1.2 
B. Effect of Cost over Negotiation
As shown in Dataset-II, we examined the results for various costs of agent C by changing MPG attribute to observe the impact of agents' relative costs on negotiation process. As expected, C travelled more with its cost increasing. Besides, overall cost reduced with one agent in the process getting more cost efficient. Although, changing cost did not make much difference on negotiation time, relative costs affected the negotiation pattern. Final costs were closer to originals when costs differences among agents were lesser. Since higher cost differences resulted in more money exchanges, overall savings were higher in those cases. Coordinates= (-15,15) AgentC (mpg, mph) =(x,50) (w1,w2)=(1,1) Coordinates= (15, 15) Given that x = (2 ,4, 6,…., 40) cost(Agent) = distance/ mpg* w1 + distance /mph* w2 Table B concludes the overall savings of all agents together for varying costs of C with different negotiation benchmark. Fig 4.2.1 Fig 4.2.2 
C. Effect of Collaboration for Proposal Generation
We observed the advantage of modifying existing unsuccessful solutions that are favored by other agents over generating straight new proposals as in [10] by agents. Experiments were conducted considering environment to be ideal. Hence, no time constraints were imposed over negotiations in both experiments. We plotted results for multiple datasets and it was observed that results were slightly or significantly cost effective after using the collaboration in all datasets. Differences were significant when differences in agents' cost values were little. V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK We have presented a negotiation protocol that meets individual and global preferences of agents through negotiation while preserving their individual data privacies. Agents in our algorithm are collaborative because an agent modifies existing proposals from other agents before generating individual new proposals. Hence, our algorithm utilizes the concept of profit sharing with individual contributions from all agents. For this reason, resulted solutions turned out to be more efficient for agents in comparison of situation when agent do not collaborate [ Table C ]. Efficiency differences are significant especially when agents' cost values were in close proximities to each other. Presented algorithm can provide effective solutions in problems, where a common optimal solution is needed in a distributed system such as network routing, transportation path meeting point problems and sharing a common resource. However, we haven't incorporated all aspects of negotiation in our algorithm. For example, introduction of coalitions among negotiating agents and self-learning in individual agents about negotiation pattern has not been studied in current algorithm, which can possibly reduce the time for negotiation and improve individual benefits. In addition to above, multiple negotiating cliques in the agent group can be studied for targeting broader range of problems in future. Apart from considering negotiation strategies, external issues such as communication cost and time constraints can further affect the utility and scope of the algorithm. Therefore, for real work implementation of our algorithm, those aspects should be considered as well.
